89% of Ukrainians are ready to fight back, even in a nuclear attack.
89% of Ukrainians are ready to fight back even if Russia uses tactical nuclear weapons against their country, and 93% of respondents consider a complete Russian withdrawal from Ukraine, including temporarily occupied Crimea, to be a condition for ceasing fire.
The survey, conducted in November 2022, shows that 95% of Ukrainians advocate continuing military resistance if Ukrainian cities are bombed.
89% vote for continuing military resistance even if Russia uses tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield or against some Ukrainian city, whereas 91% think the same even if Russia drops a nuclear bomb over the Black Sea.
Moreover, 93% of respondents are convinced that only a complete Russian withdrawal from Ukraine, including temporarily occupied Crimea, is necessary for ceasing fire. Every tenth person agrees with taking Crimea off the table; however, 80% disagree.
7% of Ukrainians support retreating the Russian army to "the demarcation line" as of 24 February 2022. 1% believes it is necessary to leave everything as it is now; 97% stand against it.
In addition, Ukrainians realise a long-term threat that comes from Russia. The majority (83%) think they will never be safe while Vladimir Putin is the Russian President. 75% believe they will not be safe without Western security guarantees. 71% name the supply of Western weapons a security condition. 65% of respondents are sure that NATO membership is a security guarantee.
Russian forces hit a production base in Kherson, killing one worker.
Russian invaders attacked Kherson using artillery on 13 February, destroying the production base of one of the local businesses and killing one of its employees.
Russian troops attacked the city today [13 February], using artillery. The enemy shells destroyed the production base building of one of the [local] businesses.
Russians attacked Sumy Oblast using mortars and artillery, over 50 strikes were recorded.
Russian forces shelled four villages and their adjacent territories in Sumy Oblast on 12 February, with more than 50 strikes recorded.
Russian attackers fired mortars on the village of Esman, delivering 28 strikes. The premises of a cafe in one of the villages were damaged in the attack. The attack on the hromada continued at around 14:00, with four strikes recorded.
Znob-Novhorodskevillage sustained a mortar attack around midday.
The Russians shelled Krasnopillia village, with nine strikes recorded.
Mortar attacks were recorded in Yunakivka village; there were three strikes after 14:00 and another seven strikes after 18:00.
Russia Targets Estonia, One of the Leaders in Backing Ukraine.
Estonia is one of the leaders in backing Ukraine, at least per capita. It became possible because of the consensus in the Estonian political community.
The parliamentary elections on March 5 could, though, change everything. The Russian Federation still hopes to change the political agenda in Estonia - if not in its favour, then at least in weakening aid to Kyiv.
Russian propaganda has already launched this campaign, promoting anti-European and anti-Ukrainian narratives. The Kremlin's information warfare arsenal includes fakes, conspiracy theories, disinformation, and manipulations.
As elsewhere, the Kremlin counts on pro-Kremlin-minded people, political activists, and politicians who still exist in Estonia even after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Kremlin's influencers could be both marginal radical politicians and representatives of respectable political forces.
In this case, we are talking about some politicians from the Center Party - currently the largest opposition force, but until recently - the ruling party.
The "centrists" had unequivocally condemned Russian aggression and tend to back Ukraine. However, the situation is not so simple.
This party would represent the Russian-speaking population of Estonia.
And accordingly, some of its members had extensively cooperated with the Russian Federation (it probably keeps doing it even now).
There are politicians among the "centrists" (although much fewer now than before) who directly or covertly promote propagandist narratives.
For example, the well-known MP Mihhail Stalnuhhin (former head of the Narva City Council) actively opposed removing the Narva tank. He reached the climax, calling Nazis those who demanded to remove Soviet memorials in Estonia. And he separately called the members of the Estonian government fascists.
The Center Party could not bear it any longer and had to remove Stalnuhhin from its ranks.
However, he is still one of the most popular politicians in Narva. Perhaps the most pro-Russian city in Estonia. Therefore, he has every chance to keep his seat in the parliament - together with the centrists or separately.
Both left and right, Radicals remain the more outspoken lobbyists of the Kremlin's interests.
They can unite in a political alliance in Estonia.
For example, the United Left Party of Estonia founded in 2008 by the merger of the Left Party and the Constitution Party of Estonia.
The United Left Party of Estonia has united with some Russian conservatives and nationalists before the 2023 election into the electoral movement Koos ("Together"). The latter was never able to obtain party status but found a way out in the alliance with the United Left Party of Estonia.
The political programme of the Koos movement is openly pro-Kremlin.
The leader of this movement, Aivo Peterson (nee Krylov), constantly points out on social media that friendship with Russia is necessary and that Estonia's assistance for Ukraine is unacceptable.
Such an alliance of leftists and conservatives may seem unnatural. However, the main thing for "Putin's friends" is still different.
A month before the parliamentary elections, there are even more fakes in the Estonian media.
For example, sharp criticism of the expansion of the Nursipalu training area attempts to sabotage and block the membership of Sweden and Finland in NATO and the spread of fakes about Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees.